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Conflicts over Dobruja during the Great War
Abstract: A sensitive topic for decades (for ideological reasons), Dobruja is still a challenge 
for many Romanian and Bulgarian historians. A peripheral and hardly populated region, 
this territory lying between the Danube and the Black Sea became the major source of 
dispute between Bucharest and Sofia at the dawn of the last century. After 1878, legal his-
tory and statistics were the pillars of the new identity of this former Ottoman territory di-
vided between Romania and Bulgaria, as a result of a decision made by the Great Powers. 
In order to meet the specific requirements of young national states, Dobruja underwent 
a colonisation process (whose intensity differed in the two parts of the region). Ethnic 
diversity caused much concern, particularly in the critical moments that endangered the 
relations between the two neighbouring countries. The Balkan Wars represented the mo-
ment when the Dobruja question officially emerged. Romania’s decision to annex South-
ern Dobruja would traumatise Bulgarian society, which would look forward to retaliating. 
This moment occurred earlier than many Romanian politicians expected. The spirit of 
revenge explains why the fighting on the Dobrujan front was so intense in the autumn of 
1916. Dobruja was the first province of the Romanian Kingdom that fell under the Central 
Powers’ occupation. The documents stored in Romanian archives are too few to make it 
possible to accurately reconstruct the history of this province during its military occu-
pation by the Central Powers. This is not an easy challenge: Romania, Bulgaria, Russia, 
Serbia, Germany, Turkey and Austro-Hungary were in some way involved in the events in 
Dobruja in the autumn of 1916.                 
Keywords: Dobruja, Bulgaria, Romania, First World War, military occupation, minorities, 
territorial disputes
Only a few days after Romania had entered the Great War, Dobruja became the Romanian army’s Achilles’ heel. For the Bucharest authorities the ter-
ritory between the Danube and the Black Sea had to play a secondary role in the 
unfolding of the military campaign. Blinded by the image of a poorly defended 
Transylvania, Romanian politicians and generals relied too much on the aid they 
had been expecting from their new allies in order to secure the border with Bul-
garia. A potential offensive triggered by the Allied Army of the Orient on the 
Salonika Front and the deployment of Russian troops in Dobruja were thought 
to be enough to immobilize the Bulgarians who, like Romanians, were facing 
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the same option of a two-front-war.1 The experience of the Second Balkan War 
definitely played an important role in making such a decision. First of all, we can 
say that Romania’s supremacy in the Balkans was an illusion if we think of it as 
the arbiter of this part of Europe. Its southern territorial expansion was seen as 
the first step in fulfilling its national ideal. Deprived of the possibility to gain real 
experience on the battlefield, the Romanian army had the ill luck of becoming 
part of a triumphalist discourse. The flaws noticed during its short campaign 
in Bulgaria were simply overlooked. The price paid for its success was the only 
thing that stirred the interest of public opinion.2 Consequently, the strategy ad-
opted by the Romanian government comes as no surprise after the outbreak of 
the Great War: repeating the tactics employed in 1913, yet at a larger scale. Ac-
cording to this scenario, maximal success was to be achieved with a minimum of 
sacrifice. However, this plan was marred by the fast and intense answer given by 
the Central Powers. The lack of experience on the battlefield was a crucial factor: 
the panic caused by the first blows on the Dobruja front put an end to the offen-
sive in Transylvania and finally led to the transformation of the 1916 Romanian 
campaign into a disaster. Some explanations that can still be found in Romanian 
historiography help us understand what happened on the Dobruja front in the 
autumn of 1916: the Russian troops’ lack of reaction and the allies’ refusal to 
fulfil the commitments undertaken by the military convention with Romania.3 
Blaming the allies for the Romanian army’s defeat in the autumn of 1916 needs 
a much more nuanced approach to what a coalition war means. Western histo-
rians are straightforward: Romania did not join the Great War so as to help its 
allies, but to pursue its national interest.4 The reality of this simple truth was 
most harshly experienced by the Serbian kingdom. While waiting for the right 
moment to enter the war, Romania preferred to forget about its commitments 
undertaken by the Treaty of Bucharest in August 1913. The Romanian govern-
1 The Military Convention signed with the Entente on 4/17 August 1916 compelled Roma-
nia to declare war against Central Powers on 15/28 August 1916, at the latest. During this 
period, its new allies had to launch an offensive  both on the Salonika Front and in Bukovina. 
Also, to counteract the Bulgarian danger Russia committed itself to deploying three divi-
sions in Dobruja. For further details about Romania’s entry into the Great War, see Glenn E. 
Torrey, Romania and World War I. A Collection of Studies (Iași/Oxford/Portland: Center for 
Romanian Studies, 1998), 95–153.
2 See Daniel Cain, “L’illusion de la suprématie dans la Péninsule Balkanique: le Royaume de 
Roumanie entre le Traité de Bucarest et Sarajevo (août 1913 – juin 1914)”, Revue des études 
sud-est européennes LII (2014), 171–192.
3 Comisia Română de Istorie Militară [The Romanian Commission of Military History], 
România în anii Primului Război Mondial [Romania in the First Years of the First World 
War], vol. II (Bucharest: Editura Militară, 1987), 578.
4 Michael B. Barrett, Prelude to Blitzkrieg. The 1916 Austro-German Campaign in Romania 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 304.
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ment’s policy was clear: the disputes between its Balkan neighbours were not 
a sufficiently serious reason to renounce its neutral status. Prime minister Ion 
I.C. Brătianu was aware that Romania’s interests could not always be the same 
as those of some countries like Serbia or Greece.5 Moreover, though part of the 
same camp, Serbia was excluded from the talks held by Brătianu over Romania’s 
entrance into the Great War. The Great Powers’ acknowledgement in writing 
of as many territorial claims of Romania as possible was crucial to Brătianu.6 
During the Paris Peace Conference, the absence of direct negotiations with the 
Serbian government during the entire year of 1916 led to the emergence of dis-
putes over the division of Banat.7
In the autumn of 1916, Dobruja unquestionably became a bloody theatre 
which involved civilians too. Romanians, Russians and Serbians fought side by 
side on this initially 140-km-long front against the Bulgarian, German, Turkish 
and Austro-Hungarian troops. Irregular fighting and excesses against the civil-
ian population occurred during the four months of war in Dobruja. Exacerbated 
nationalist feelings explain the atrocities committed on both sides during these 
months of war waged on the Dobruja battlefront. History provides an explana-
tion for this matter of fact. A border region with a mixed population, Dobruja 
became a territory disputed between Romania and Bulgaria at the beginning of 
the past century, as long as the Balkan borders began to change. For the Bucha-
rest authorities Bulgaria gradually began to be viewed as a problematic state, as 
well as a competitor to Romania’s supremacy in the region. The rift between the 
two states was caused by the Romanian government’s decision to take advantage 
of Bulgaria’s military and diplomatic difficulties in order to modify their com-
mon border in Romania’s own interest in the summer of 1913. The need for a 
strategic border with Bulgaria was brought into discussion in order to justify 
the annexation of Southern Dobruja (nearly 8,000 km2 in area). Even if Roma-
nians amounted to 5 per cent of the population of the new territory (estimated 
to nearly 300,000 inhabitants, particularly Turks and Bulgarians),8 people in 
Bucharest were hopeful of the successful integration of this region into the Ro-
5 I. G. Duca, Amintiri politice [Political Memoirs], vol. II (Munich: Jon Dumitru Verlag, 
1981), 25. 
6 Keith Hitchins, Ion I.C. Brătianu. Romania (London: Haus Publishing Ltd., 2011), 82.
7 Sherman David Spector, Rumania at the Paris Peace Conference (New York: Bookman As-
sociation, Inc., 1962), 123–126.
8 George Georgescu, Județul Caliacra din punct de vedere administrativ, financiar, economic, 
social și cultural [Caliacra County from an Administrative, Financial, Economic, Social and 
Cultural Point of View] (Bucharest: Institutul de Arte Grafice Carol Göbl, 1915), 3; Ion N. 
Cămărășeșcu, Durostorul. Expunerea situațiunei județului la 1 decembrie 1914 [Durostor. The 
County’s State of Affairs on 1 December 1914] (Bucharest: Tipografia Ion C. Văcărescu, 
1915), 20.
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manian Kingdom. The manner in which Northern Dobruja was colonized and 
transformed after 1878, when it was annexed to Romania by the Congress of 
Berlin, fuelled the Romanian authorities’ trust in the success of their mission.9 
Therefore, an exceptional regime was the solution for this new Romanian ter-
ritory. The Romanian Parliament held open discussions of the different issues 
when the two parts of Dobruja were annexed. Take Ionescu, former minister 
of the interior, provides a necessary explanation: in 1878, we annexed a Turk-
ish province with a rare population. In 1913, we received a strip of land with 
a population that led a constitutional life for three decades. As a result, warns 
Ionescu, we should show those whom we uprooted from their homeland that we 
are superior to their former sovereigns by our tolerance and civilization.10
Despite the Bucharest authorities’ optimistic attitude, the territory an-
nexed by Romania in the summer of 1913 proved to be a real time bomb, not 
only because of the feelings experienced by the Bulgarian minority, but also of 
the feelings of rage and revenge the Romanian campaign across the Danube pro-
voked in Bulgarian society. Shortly afterwards, Romania was to be perceived as 
a treacherous neighbour that deprived Bulgaria of the possibility to harvest its 
victories won during the First Balkan War.11 Resentments escalated until the 
armies of the two countries faced each other on the battlefield. In the autumn of 
1915, the decision of Bulgaria to join the Central Powers enhanced the Roma-
nian government’s distrust. All the war plans drafted by the Romanian General 
Headquarters both before 1913, and particularly between 1914 and 1916, con-
sidered Bulgaria a hostile state.12 Special attention was paid to the monitoring of 
Bulgarian propaganda among the inhabitants of Southern Dobruja.13 
In November 1915, prime minister Ion I.C. Brătianu approved a detailed 
action plan that had to be put into execution by the Romanian authorities in the 
territory annexed after the end of the Second Balkan War, in the event of a war 
with Bulgaria. Essentially, the plan contained the steps that the civil and mili-
9 See Constantin Iordachi, “The California of the Romanians: Integration of Northern 
Dobrogea into Romania, 1878–1913”, in Balázs Trencsényi et al., eds., Nation-building and 
Contested Identities: Romanian and Hungarian Case Studies (Budapest/Iași: Regio Books/
Polirom, 2001), 121–152.
10 Desbaterile Adunării Deputaților [The Deputy Assembly Debates], Sesiunea ordinară 1914 
[Ordinary Session], no. 30/29 March 1914, ședința din 27 martie 1914 [meeting of 27 March 
1914], 400, 404.
11 Anastas Ishirkov, Кŭsi napŭtni belezhki vŭrhu Dobrudzha i Moravsko (Sofia 1917), 16.   
12 Ministerul Apărării Naționale [The Ministry of National Defence], România în Războiul 
Mondial [Romania in the Great War], vol. I (Bucharest: Imprimeria Națională, 1934), 83–84. 
13 See, e.g., Arhivele Naționale ale României [National Archives of Romania], Serviciul 
Arhive Naționale Istorice Centrale [The Central Historical National Archives Department, 
hereafter SANIC], Direcția Poliției și Siguranței Generale [Police and General Security Di-
vision], files 132/1914, 556/1914, 243/1915. 
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tary authorities from Southern Dobruja had to follow during the week before 
the Romanian army was to be mobilised. The plan aimed to put in requisition 
all that was deemed as necessary for the army’s needs (animals, food products, 
transportation means). They had to be shipped over to the other side of the 
Danube. Also, all the suspects had to be detained and then deported along with 
“all men of foreign nationality aged between 18 and 60” who lived in the area 
of Romanian fortresses. The remaining population (women, elderly people and 
children) had to be warned over the consequences of “any act of hostility or trea-
son” for the Romanian troops. More specifically, not only the culprits, but also 
their relatives would pay with their life.14 The events that unfolded in August 
1916 show that the Romanian authorities enforced the measures that had been 
agreed upon nine months before.15 Official statistics say that between August 
1916 and April 1918 the Romanian government decided to intern about 38,000 
civilians. There were three categories of civilians interned by the Romanian au-
thorities: those who held the enemy states’ citizenship, those who had obtained 
Romanian citizenship and those who had not. The deportations, as well as the 
requisition and arson of villages during the retreat of the Romanian army show 
that the Bucharest authorities saw Southern Dobruja as a hostile territory. This 
is easily explained by the lack of trust in the loyalty of the new subjects. Statistics 
are clear in this respect: ethnic Bulgarians (over 60%) and ethnic Turks (almost 
15%) are the most numerous interned civilians who were Romanian subjects. 
On the other hand, the number of interned civilians – Romanian subjects – was 
double compared to that of civilians from enemy countries.16 
Romania’s war plan (the so-called Hypothesis Z) included an offensive 
across the Carpathians and a defensive in Dobruja. Subsequently, an offensive 
was to be launched in Dobruja as well. Three quarters of the Romanian troops 
were engaged in the Transylvania offensive. It was expected that in 40 days’ time 
the Romanian army would reach the Hungarian Plain. Once a new offensive was 
launched, the Romanian troops based in the south had to reach the Ruse-Varna 
line in only a few days.17 It seems to have been an easy campaign won from the 
very start. Yet this successful plan depended on two questionable factors: 1) Was 
14 SANIC, Mihail Berceanu Personal Fonds, file I Ca 39, 1–19. 
15 George Georgescu, Fapte, împrejurări și amintiri în timpul neutralității și războiului. 1914–
1919 [Facts, Circumstances and Memories during the Neutrality Period and the War. 1914–
1919] (Bucharest: Cartea Românească, 1933), 22–23.
16 Bogdan Negoi, Mărturii documentare: Lagărele de prizonieri din România în timpul primului 
război mondial [Documentary Testimonies: The Romanian Prison Camps during the First 
World War] (Geamăna-Argeș: Tiparg, 2009), 214.
17 Comisia română de istorie militară [The Romanian Commission of Military History], 
Proiecte și planuri de operațiuni ale Marelui Stat Major Român (până în anul 1916) [Projects 
and Operation Plans of the Romanian General Staff ], (Bucharest, 1992), 178–191.
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the military operation coordination between the allies possible? 2) How would 
the enemy general headquarters react?  
Due to the extension of the Russian front, Dobruja was the territory of 
the first direct military collaboration between Russia and its allies. The Roma-
nian prime minister considered that the presence of Russian troops in Dobruja 
was compulsory so as to secure the southern border of the country. Some politi-
cians from Bucharest and Petrograd believed that the Bulgarians would not dare 
shoot those who liberated them in 1877 from Ottoman rule.18 This reasoning 
was not shared by the commander of the Russian troops that were to be sent in 
Dobruja. General Andrei Zayonchkovski was suspicious of the troops of Serbi-
an-Croatian volunteers he led, i.e. the famous Serbian First Division led by Col-
onel Stevan Hadžić.19 Above all, he did not trust the former Austro-Hungarians 
soldiers’ capacity to fight. Besides, he feared that the Bulgarian-Serbian antipa-
thy would be stronger than the Bulgarian-Russian sympathy.20 There were also 
the Russians’ doubts about the operational capacity of the troops dislocated at 
the border with Bulgaria, as Romanians lacked any real war experience. 
While Brătianu was holding final negotiations over the country’s entrance 
into the war, the German, Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian general headquar-
ters began to elaborate an action plan for this scenario in July 1916. A month be-
fore Romania’s entrance into the war, the Central Powers had already approved 
a concrete action plan for the new frontline. Briefly, first they aimed at attracting 
as many troops as possible in Transylvania, followed by a massive offensive of 
the Bulgarian troops in Dobruja and, eventually, the crossing of the Danube 
and the advancement to Bucharest.21 The concrete details of this plan sparked 
off disputes between the allies. The Bulgarian Chief of Staff, General Zhostov, 
objected to the Bulgarian troops’ crossing of the Danube and their fast advance-
ment to Bucharest. There were few troops available for such an undertaking 
and the danger of a Romanian offensive in Dobruja was too high. Zhostov was 
reticent to allow the presence of Turkish divisions in Dobruja, and to accept that 
Field-marshal August von Mackensen could take over the lead of the Bulgarian 
troops that would fight against Romania.22 His unexpected death on the very 
18 Duca, Amintiri, 266.
19 Information (including information contained in the Romanian archives) on the presence 
of this division on the Dobrujan front can be found in Miodrag Milin, “Voluntari sârbi pe 
frontul românesc din toamna anului 1916” [Serbian Volunteers on the Romanian Front in 
the Autumn of 1916], Analele Banatului XXI (2013), 439–453.
20 Barrett, Prelude, 70.
21 See Ministerstvo na voĭnata, Bŭlgarskata armiia v Svetovnata voĭna, 1915–1918, vol. VIII: 
Voĭnata sreshtu Rumŭnia prez 1916 godina (Sofia: Dŭrzhavna pechatnitsa, 1939), 60–75.
22 Gen. Sava Savov, gen. Konstantin Zhostov, Intimnite prichini za pogromite na Bŭlgariia 
(Sofia: Izadtelstvo Zemia, 2000), 143–155.
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eve of the outbreak of the war with Romania smoothed these disputes. Mean-
while, the Bulgarian troops had taken over control on the Salonika Front, thus 
hampering the likelihood of any offensive launched by the Allied Army of the 
Orient. Consequently, a key condition for Romania’s entrance into the war was 
missing just days before the Romanian army was mobilized. From that moment 
on, the German and Bulgarian authorities could plan the counteroffensive at the 
southern border of Romania in case the latter declared war against the Central 
Powers. The first movements of the Bulgarian troops from the Salonika Front 
to the border with Romania began prior to the mobilization of the Romanian 
army.23
On the evening of 14/27 August 1916, Romania declared war only 
against Austro-Hungary. Brătianu was reluctant to declare war against Bulgaria 
straight away. The head of the Bucharest Cabinet believed that during the first 
days of the Romanian campaign the military effort was required only in Tran-
sylvania. Of course, if the Bulgarian troops had attacked the Romanian or the 
Russian troops in Dobruja, the prime minister would have been forced to de-
clare war against Bulgaria too.24 The Bulgarian government needed four days 
to react. In fact, Bulgaria was the last ally of Austro-Hungary that declared war 
against Romania. This generated an exaggerated felling of enthusiasm in Bucha-
rest. It was believed that the presence of Russian soldiers in Dobruja was the 
reason for the Bulgarian troops’ inactivity.25 The Bulgarian government’s lack 
of immediate reaction irked the German general headquarters that considered 
their ally to be reluctant. In order to make a political decision, the Bulgarian 
sovereign summoned the Crown Council.26 Prime Minister Vasil Radoslavov 
was anxious not only about the difficulty in waging a two-front war but also 
about the ever-growing number of Russian troops on the Dobruja front. For a 
society divided into Russophiles and Russophobes such a presence could exert a 
strong influence on the political life of the Bulgarian state.27 Finally, the last dis-
putes over an offensive in Dobruja were resolved. Surprise was the key element 
of this offensive. A moral victory was expected before mobilizing more troops 
in Dobruja. The Bulgarian general headquarters objective was to immediately 
23 Glenn E. Torrey, The Romanian Battlefront in World War I (Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 2012), 30–44.
24 General Vasile Rudeanu, Memorii din timpuri de pace și de război, 1884–1929 [Memoirs of 
Peace and War, 1884–1929] (Bucharest: Cavallioti, 2004), 180.
25 Constantin Argetoianu, Memorii [Memoirs], vols. III–IV (Bucharest: Editura Machi-
avelli, 2008), 34.
26 Georgi Markov, Goliamata voĭna i bŭlgarskiia mech nad balkanskiia vŭzel, 1914–1919, vol. I: 
Zaplitaneto (Sofia: Izdatelstvo Zahariĭ Stoianov, 2016), 412–413.
27 D-r Vasil Radoslavov, Dnevni belezhki 1914–1918 (Sofia: Izdatelstvo UI “Sv. Kliment 
Ohridski”, 1993), 195–196.
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take control of the major Romanian fortifications in Southern Dobruja and to 
establish the front along the Cernavodă–Constanța line. Much easier to defend, 
this line covered the shortest distance between the Danube and the Black Sea 
(approximately 50 km).28 
Almost two months of bloody war were needed for the troops of the 
Central Powers to achieve their goals on the Dobruja front. The occupation of 
the strategic railway between Constanța and Cernavodă deprived the Romanian 
army of the possibility to launch massive operations in Dobruja because of its 
lack of infrastructure. Controlling the shortest distance between the Black Sea 
and the Danube, the troops of the Central Powers enjoyed great strategic advan-
tages: they could defend this part of the front more easily and could also dislo-
cate a part of the troops. In late November 1916, a part of these troops crossed 
the Danube and joined the units that entered Wallachia after having crossed the 
Carpathians. By the end of the year, the Bulgarian troops managed to conquer 
the rest of Northern Dobruja, which was only defended by Russian troops.29 A 
new chapter in the tumultuous history of this land began. This time the emerg-
ing disputes were related to the economic exploitation of the Romanian territo-
ry occupied by the Central Powers. Sharing the spoils of war was an important 
stake, as was the region’s economic exploitation, a real breath of fresh air for the 
ailing economies of the countries that had been at war for years. The grievances 
were caused by the disproportion between the contribution to conquering this 
region and the quota share of the spoils of war. The oil and grain reserves in 
Constanța, as well as the railway which connected this port to Cernavodă were 
of paramount importance to the Germans, who dismissed the idea of a Bul-
garian civil and military administration in Northern Dobruja. It was declared 
an occupation military zone that was briefly under German administration. In-
stead, the German general headquarters decided to leave Southern Dobruja un-
der Bulgarian administration. Austro-Hungary and Turkey were also interested 
in exploiting Dobruja’s economic potential.30 
Much to the Bulgarian authorities’ dissatisfaction, this status quo was 
maintained until the spring of 1918. After the collapse of the Russian front, ac-
cepting the tough conditions imposed by its victors was Romania’s only chance. 
28 Bŭlgarskata armiia v Svetovnata voĭna, 270–331.
29 Torrey, Romanian Battlefront, 110–117.
30 Information about the Central Powers’ Administration in Dobrogea can be found in a 
memorandum signed by the German General Kurt von Unger, published in Constanța in 
1917. In 2012, this brochure was reedited in a bilingual  edition: Valentin Ciorbea, Constan-
tin Cheramidoglu and Walter Rastätter, eds., Denkschrift der Deutschen Etappen Verwaltung 
in der Dobrudscha Abgeschlossen Mitte April 1917/Memoriu al administrației germane de etapă 
în Dobrogea. Întocmit la mijlocul lui aprilie 1917 [Memorandum of the German Stage Admin-
istration of Dobruja Issued in Mid-April 1917] (Constanța: Ex Ponto, 2012), 1–123.
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The Peace Treaty of Bucharest signed on 24 April/7 May 1918 stipulated that 
Romania “cedes to Bulgaria the Bulgarian territory which had fallen to it as a 
result of the peace treaty of Bucharest of 1913” with a small rectification of the 
frontier in favour of the latter. Also, Northern Dobruja, which Romania ceded 
to the Central Powers, was to be administered as a condominium. In exchange, 
the Central Powers pledged that Romania would get “a guaranteed commercial 
road to the Black Sea” by way of Cernavodă and Constanța.31 Visibly dissatisfied 
with the new status of Northern Dobruja, the Sofia government hoped that this 
formula would help the Bulgarians play first fiddle and would thus be subse-
quently able to take control of the whole province. It was only in September that 
a new agreement was reached on Northern Dobruja, which passed under com-
plete Bulgarian control in exchange for certain commitments undertaken by the 
Sofia Cabinet towards its allies. This is, however, a legally unimportant act, given 
that Bulgaria was forced to surrender a week later.32 This was the beginning of 
the end for the Central Powers. Only a day before the capitulation of Germany, 
the Romanian government entered the war again. This symbolic gesture, which 
pointed to the forthcoming peace treaty, placed Romania in the victorious camp. 
The Central Powers’ administration in Dobruja was replaced by that of the En-
tente, which mediated the return of the Romanian authorities. The Bulgarian 
troops were urged to pull out of Dobruja up to the border drawn in the summer 
of 1913.  This situation gave rise to new feelings of resentment. The return of the 
Romanian authorities faced the opposition of the Bulgarian population. French, 
English and Italian troops were deployed in Dobruja so as to secure peace in the 
region until a new peace treaty was signed. Unfortunately, the Treaty of Neuilly 
(27 November 1919) failed to put an end to the violence that occurred at the 
Romanian-Bulgarian border. The wounds of war were too fresh to be healed by 
a diplomatic treaty alone. Throughout the interwar period, Dobruja was a trou-
blesome issue both for the Romanian and for the Bulgarian authorities. When 
the Second World War broke out, an exchange of population and a recreation 
of the old border established in 1878 were the last resort. During the time that 
elapsed from the signing of the Treaty of Craiova (7 September 1940), the two 
parts of Dobruja irreversibly lost their ethnic and confessional diversity, which 
caused many problems to the inflexible politicians in Sofia and Bucharest.  
31 For the English translation of the Peace Treaty between Romania and the Central Powers, 
see United States, Department of State, Texts of the Roumanian “Peace” (Washington, DC: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1918), 5–28.
32 Antonina Kuzmanova et al., eds., Istoriia na Dobrudza, vol. IV (Veliko Tŭrnovo: Izdatels-
tvo “Faber”, 2007), 222–236.
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